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NOMINATION OF JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

APRIL 21, 1983

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NOMINATION OF JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1983

U. S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to other business, at 12:20 p.m., in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower and Nunn.

Staff present: Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; and Jacquie S. O'Grady, staff assistant.

Also present: John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter D. Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets today to consider the nomination of Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. We are pleased to have General Wickham with us.

General Wickham has served with distinction in a number of positions in the Army. He is presently the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Prior to this service, he was for 3 years the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of the U.S. Forces in Korea.

He previously served as Director of the Joint Staff of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans of the Army, and commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky.

General Wickham's experience also includes service in the office of the Secretary of Defense, with U.S. activities in Vietnam, and other positions with the Joint Chiefs.

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, General Wickham holds two masters degrees from Harvard University. He has also completed advanced military courses at the Army Infantry School, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the National War College.

General Wickham, we are pleased to have you with us today.

[The nomination reference and biographical sketch of General Wickham follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
March 15, 1983.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following-named officer, under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, Section 3034, to be Chief of Staff, United States Army:

To be Chief of Staff, United States Army

Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., 092–20–1086, United States Army.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JOHN ADAMS WICKHAM, JR., GENERAL

Date and place of birth: 25 June 1928, Dobbs Ferry, New York.

Years of active commissioned service: Over 32.

Present assignment: Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 20310, since June 1982.

Military schools attended: The Infantry School, Basic and Advanced Courses; United States Army Command and General Staff College; Armed Forces Staff College; The National War College.

Educational degrees: U.S. Military Academy, BS Degree, Military Science; Harvard University, MPA Degree, Public Administration; Harvard University, MA Degree, Politics, Economics, and Government.

Recent major duty assignments:

February 1968 to October 1969: Member, Nuclear Branch, later Short Range Branch, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, J5, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

October 1969 to July 1970: Commander, 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe.

August 1970 to August 1971: Member, Staff Group, Office, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

September 1971 to March 1973: Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic Affairs, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

June 1973 to February 1976: Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

February 1976 to March 1978: Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

April 1978 to July 1978: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

July 1978 to July 1979: Director, Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

July 1979 to June 1982: Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea/Commander, Eighth United States Army.

We are also pleased to have our distinguished colleague, Senator Sasser from Tennessee, who, I believe, would like to present the nominee to the committee at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SASSER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE

Senator SASSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nunn.

I am pleased to appear before this committee today in company with and in behalf of Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr. I share with my distinguished senior colleague, Senator Baker, the privilege of commending the administration's choice of General Wickham to be the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

Mr. Chairman, you and this committee are very familiar with the distinguished military career of General Wickham, so I won't dwell on that except to say that he has served his country with honor for 32 years.

I had the privilege of knowing him personally since he commanded the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky. We are very proud of the 101st Airborne Division in Tennessee, one of the most illustrious military units in our Army.

I had the occasion to visit that installation frequently when General Wickham was commanding there. The General and I share many mutual acquaintances. I can say assuredly that I share with all who know him the greatest respect for his outstanding character, his dedication to duty, and his high standard of professionalism.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, that several officers who served under him at Fort Campbell, some of whom are now retired and are constituents of mine in Tennessee, contacted me concerning General Wickham's confirmation. All were enthusiastic in their recommendation of General Wickham for this position.

One of them, his former Deputy Post Commander, a distinguished soldier-scholar I would characterize him, by the name of Art Lombardi, wrote me this note about General Wickham.

Colonel Lombardi said:

> General Wickham was without reservation the very best General I have ever served with in my years in the Army. He is articulate, highly intelligent and dedicated. This is coupled with a compassion concern for the rank and file soldiers and their dependents.

Colonel Lombardi comments:

> He was thorough, he has an across-the-board understanding and perception of how the Army works. These assets make him a singularly outstanding choice as the next Army Chief of Staff.

Mr. Chairman, I place high regard in Colonel Lombardi's—now retired—perception and judge of character, not the least of which is reinforced by the fact Art Lombardi took an active role in my campaign for reelection this last year.

But General Wickham exemplifies the quality of leadership that our military forces need as our Nation faces the unknown challenges in an uncertain future. He is serious, he is hard working, he is proven.

General Wickham is experienced under both combat conditions and in policymaking roles. These personal attributes will all continue to contribute to our national security and the well-being of our military services.

So, I am enthusiastic, Mr. Chairman, in my recommendation of General Wickham. I wish to commend the administration for what I consider to be an outstanding choice and I join with my senior colleague, Senator Baker, in noting that there are some reports that in the years to come General Wickham may return to his former home in Tennessee.

So, it is with great pride that I urge this committee to act in a speedy confirmation of General Wickham as Army Chief of Staff.

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my personal appreciation to you for allowing me to appear here this morning and testify in behalf of General Wickham.

Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator Sasser.

Without objection, I will place at this point in the record the statement submitted by Senator Baker who wanted to be here, but was detained on Senate business. It sets forth his warm endorsement.

[The prepared statement of Senator Howard Baker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. OF TENNESSEE, REGARDING THE NOMINATION OF GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., TO BE CHIEF OF THE ARMY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Jackson and Members of the committee, it is a distinct privilege and high honor for me to appear before you to introduce Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., of Tennessee, on the occasion of his nomination to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Although General Wickham was born in New York, he has adopted Tennessee as his home and on behalf of my State, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we are proud to claim him as a Tennessean.

For that reason, it is fortunate that General Wickham was assigned in 1976 command of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, which we share somewhat reluctantly with our neighboring state to the north. During his tenure with the 101st, he established a close personal and professional relationship with the citizens of Clarksville, Tenn., and I know of no community adjacent to a major military installation that has a better relationship between the military and civilian populace than Clarksville. General Wickham has bought a home there, plans eventually to retire there, and I am certain that he will continue to foster that excellent relationship following his retirement.

Since General Wickham is no stranger to this committee, I will not attempt to describe here the long and distinguished career that has led him to this ultimate position in the Army. I will say, Mr. Chairman, that in reviewing General Wickham's record, I was struck with the number of positions he has held that will serve him well in the performance of the responsibility he is about to undertake. Not only has he served in every major theatre of operation, he has 12 years of experience in Joint and Allied headquarters, which will prove valuable as we seek to maintain and strengthen the several alliances on which our security depends. I am also tempted to add, Mr. Chairman, that his experience as the Deputy Negotiator on peace treaty issues with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military leaders is probably the best experience he could have had to prepare him for the politics of Washington.

With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I will observe that it is critically important, perhaps now more than ever before, that communication between the civilian and military leadership be as open, candid and forthcoming as we can possibly make it. I am convinced that the country and the military have now virtually fully recovered from the effects of the Vietnam war. Our armed services are once again held in the high esteem they so well deserve and there is a broad consensus among the American people on the need to build and maintain our strength and the unquestioned ability to defend this country. We will be able to take advantage of this opportunity only if there is an open and honest dialogue on both sides of the Potomac.

Through my discussions with General Wickham, I believe that he shares that view and will do everything he can to ensure that the military and the political branches of the government cooperate effectively to fashion the defenses necessary for our security. I am confident that he will be, in every respect, an outstanding Chief of Staff and I commend him to the consideration of this committee.

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham, before I give you an opportunity to speak I would like to introduce Mrs. Wickham. We are delighted to have you here today, Mrs. Wickham.

Will you stand and let us recognize you.

General WICKHAM. Also I have my daughter here, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Would you please stand?

Ms. WICKHAM. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham?

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, U.S. ARMY

General WICKHAM. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you very much for the opportunity to spend a few minutes here on behalf of my nomination. I look forward to the support of this committee for that nomination.

I am delighted that my wife and one of my children are here to hear all these good things that are said about me. I have two other children, a son who is a first lieutenant at Fort Carson and another son still in college. Unfortunately, they could not be here.

Some of the Senators here recognize I have been before this committee previously in my earlier capacity with United States and U.N. forces in Korea. I have appreciated the support in that capacity, and I look forward to that support in the years to come.

It is important for me to affirm to you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that I have a deep faith and belief in the constitutional process of our Government. Therefore, in accordance with that faith and belief, and from my long years of service under two Secretaries of Defense, you can be assured that I will be candid and open in my advice and testimony before this committee and other committees of the Congress.

As to the direction of the U.S. Army, it is in good hands; it has been in excellent hands with General Meyer and his predecessor, General Rogers.

Secretary Marsh, General Meyer, and I share a common vision about the future of the Army. We will continue many of the policies that have been established, try to improve on them, fine-tuning those that need it, and dealing with the changing world which we face in the future.

I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to the future with the U.S. Army and our dealings with the Congress.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Wickham.

The Congress has at least an equal responsibility with the executive branch for the maintenance of our military establishment. We want your assurance, General—I think you have already given it—that whenever you are summoned before this committee you will give us, when we ask for it, your professional military judgment on any matter that we may be considering regardless of what the policy of the administration may be.

General WICKHAM. You can be assured of that, sir.

Chairman TOWER. General Wickham, I have some other questions to submit to you to which you may respond in writing for the record. I have already asked you some of these in private sessions. I can anticipate what your answers would be, but I would like to submit them to you for response for the record.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions.

General Wickham is an outstanding soldier. He has served the country with great distinction and great honor. I have had the pleasure of working with him when he was commander of our forces in Korea.

I look forward to working with him in this position. It is an important position. The things I learned this morning I will have to con-

sider. I did not know about the Sasser connection or the Harvard connection, but I won't hold either of those against you.

I plan to support your confirmation with a great deal of enthusiasm.

I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I have not agreed with everything that the Reagan administration has done in the military field, but I have agreed on making defense our No. 1 priority.

Another thing I have said over and over again is that I think we have done an excellent job in selecting our top people for military achievement. They have done an exceptional job with previous selections and I think General Wickham is another strong step in that respect. I think they are doing an excellent job in getting the finest people available to serve in our top positions in the military.

AIR-LAND BATTLE CONCEPT

General Wickham, you mentioned you share General Meyer's policies as now being implemented.

Does that include the Air-Land Battle 2000 concept?

General WICKHAM. Most assuredly. Basically, Air-Land Battle is a doctrinal definition of the way we are prepared to go to war today. We have been practicing Air-Land Battle in Korea for the past 4 or 5 years.

Simply put, it is to look deep and to strike deep to interdict the second and third echelons of enemy forces before they arrive at the close-in battle area.

Air-Land Battle 2000 obviously is looking beyond the current situation, to capitalize on technology and new doctrinal and organizational ideas of mobility and lethality. We need much more definition in this area of Air-Land Battle 2000. Right now we are looking at it in a less than precise way. We have defined it in less than precise ways to capitalize on research and development opportunities. Most assuredly, it is an evolutionary growth of philosophy for fighting and I am committed to that evolutionary growth.

Senator NUNN. One aspect of that I think you would agree that has great potential is beefing up and greatly improving our conventional munitions.

Do you generally agree with that?

General WICKHAM. Yes, sir. The march of technology is relentless. We need to capitalize on that technology to improve our firepower, our command, control and communications, to improve our mobility, our survivability, and our chemical capabilities.

Part of that does involve smart munitions and part involves improvement in firepower across the board. We need to capitalize on firepower capability and technology because we do not have the requisite numbers of units and personnel to field in a potential fight. We must use technology to overcome the disparities in terms of numbers.

EQUIVALENCY WITH WARSAW PACT NATIONS

Senator NUNN. We don't have enough platforms to be able to consider ourselves at least quantitatively equal to the Warsaw Pact, and I say "We" with a capital W, in NATO. That means planes and tanks, as platforms.

It seems to me we can make a major leap forward by upgrading what are essentially World War II type munitions that we use from those platforms, whether it is artillery or whether it is from a plane, and so forth. I don't think there is much dissent on that.

I think General Meyer agrees with that. I think General Gabriel of the Air Force agrees with it. Dr. DeLauer has been on record in favor of that. I think Secretary of Defense Weinberger even made that kind of presentation to the NATO allies.

What is disturbing to me is that in spite of these high-level endorsements, I don't find that kind of priority in the budget or even in the 5-year budget plan.

I won't ask you to comment on that now, but I will seek your close examination of the 1989 budget and the 5-year plan as it pertains to those muntions. I think we have an awful lot of potential there that is simply not being budgeted and it is being squeezed out for what I believe are less urgent priorities.

Would you take a look at that?

General WICKHAM. Yes, sir. May I comment briefly on that point because I share your concern?

Joint programs are sometimes the first to drop out of service budgets in the review process. For the first time this year we have practiced a novel approach to joint issues; the Army and the Air Force have participated together as we built our budgets for fiscal year 1985.

Where there is that joint process, we have been able to develop both joint support for some of these smart munitions and growth of capability in the point arena. We are sensitive to the concern you have expressed. I will do my best to insure that we provide the best munitions for our forces.

Senator NUNN. There will be a hearing on that in the House within the next week or two that I will be at least following closely. I may try to participate in it. I do think it is enormously important for the amount of money you have to spend in this area in 5 years.

What you get in additional effectiveness from your existing platforms is a high leverage kind of capability as far as I am concerned.

General WICKHAM. Amen.

READINESS

Chairman TOWER. May I say I do not disagree with Senator Nunn. I simply think, however, there should be some comment on the need to maintain a level of sustainability with what we have now.

You know we can't predict just when the balloon might go up. Therefore, we have to have an adequate inventory of what already is the state of the art.

Is that not true?

General WICKHAM. That is correct, sir. You are referring to readiness—maintaining a high state of readiness with existing resources and not denegrating that capability by moving more and more into the high technology area. We have to strike a balance.

Senator NUNN. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think we necessarily, though, have to balance the existing munitions and adequate supply versus new munitions.

I think we can also take a look at new munitions vis-a-vis new platforms. As far as I am concerned, new munitions have a high priority to greatly increase the effectiveness of existing platforms rather than going to new platforms at the expense of munitions.

I am not saying it is either/or in any of these categories. I think we have such an enormous potential in that area. No matter what the budget is—even if President Reagan's budget doubles—we will not have enough platforms in and of themselves to be able to compete successfully with the Warsaw Pact.

Chairman TOWER. I am delighted to hear you say that. I know that you will help us in our efforts to sustain defense funding at the highest possible level.

Senator NUNN. With a good rational program, sound military strategy and reasonable priorities, I am with you 100 percent.

Chairman TOWER. I think we had better cut this off.

General, thank you very much.

I want to add my endorsement to that of others. I think you will do a splendid job. We look forward to cooperating with you and trying to help you in any way we can to support your efforts.

Senator NUNN. Are we going to poll the absent members?

Chairman TOWER. I am prepared to entertain a motion that he be favorably reported and we will poll the members.

Senator NUNN. I so move.

Chairman TOWER. It will be done and the members will be polled by close of business this evening.

Senator NUNN. I vote Aye.

Senator Stennis gave me his proxy for an Aye vote.

Chairman TOWER. And I vote Aye.

Senator Nunn, would you move the reporting of 3,696 routine military nominations that have been before the committee for the required length of time and to which no objection has been raised?

Senator NUNN. I so move.

Chairman TOWER. Without objection, they will be favorably reported.

That is it, gentlemen.

General WICKHAM. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. You got off easy today.

[Questions submitted by Chairman John Tower to be answered for the record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN JOHN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

REGIMENTAL MANNING SYSTEM

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, what is your view of the new regimental manning system which the Army is now experimenting with?

General WICKHAM. I support the development and evaluation of the New Manning System and its major sub-elements: The COHORT unit replacement system and the U.S. Army Regimental System. These initiatives seek to increase combat effectiveness by reducing turbulence and enhancing cohesion and esprit through innovative changes to the personnel management process. This concept complements our other ongoing modernization programs such as new equipment procurement, the heavy Division 86 reorganization, and our AirLand Battle 2000 doctrine. The New Manning System strives to bring focus on intangible combat multipliers such as cohesion, morale, esprit, tradition and the welfare of Army families.

While these goals are laudable, we recognize the challenge associated with implementing such a concept Army-wide. Accordingly, we have charted a deliberate course for transition and are progressing at a prudent pace to insure that we learn how to sustain such a system before we expand it throughout the combat arms. Currently, we have 42 COHORT companies in the force and will expand to approximately 110 units through the end of fiscal year 1985. While this level of effort is not disruptive to combat readiness or to other modernization initiatives, it will provide enough time and experience to make the systemic changes needed for sustainability.

COMBAT READINESS IMPROVEMENTS

Senator TOWER. General Wickman, we have seen substantial combat readiness improvements during General Meyer's term as Chief of Staff. Are you supportive of the programs General Meyer introduced, and what do you intend to do to further enhance combat readiness?

General WICKHAM. I believe that continuity of purpose and stability in policies and programs are essential to continued high levels of Army readiness and, as pointed out in my statement, I share Secretary Marsh's and General Meyer's vision of the future of the Army. I intend to continue many of the current policies and improve on them wherever there is an opportunity. Today's Army is the smallest in 30 years; in fact, it is almost 200,000 smaller than before the Vietnam war. Given the extent of our overseas commitments and the range of threats the Army may be tasked by civilian authority to respond to, we have to maintain and, where possible, improve on the quality of today's fine Army. This calls for balance among several endeavors to improve quality. We need programs to attract and retain the best people in the Active and Reserve components. We need to toughen training with realism and extensive joint as well as combined exercise involving allies. We need to continue programs of equipping our Active and Reserve Forces and to building war reserve stocks. And we need programs to capitalize on technology so that we can modernize in keeping with the threat. All of these programs contribute to improved readiness.

ROLE OF THE ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD

Senator TOWER. What is your assessment of the appropriate role of the Army Reserve and National Guard?

General WICKHAM. I have long been a supporter of improved readiness and capabilities for the Army's Reserve components. Consequently I intend to pursue programs which improve their equipment status. In fiscal year 1984 over $1 billion of equipment, most of it new, will be delivered to the Reserve components, and in our fiscal year 1984 budget over $1 billion of new procurement is planned for the Reserve components. This will continue. Also, efforts will be made to increase the size of the Reserve components so that their combat and support capabilities will buttress the small Active Army. Finally, plans call for improving the readiness of the Reserves by enhanced training and a substantial increase in full-time manning.

As you know, the roles of the Reserve components are to provide sustainment and reinforcement for our Active Component forces. The Reserve components are organized to fill these roles with combat forces for reinforcement, support forces for sustainment and general purpose forces for the mobilization base. Additionally the Individual Ready Reserve provides the pool of pre-trained soldiers as fillers, replacements and unit cadre for the total Army. I believe these roles are appropriate.

PRIMARY ARMY GOALS

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, what are the two or three primary goals that you would set for the Army as its Chief of Staff?

General WICKHAM. First, I intend to assure that our Army is filled with the best people—Active soldiers, Reserve component soldiers, and civilians. This will require talented leadership, programs to attract and retain quality, and solid commitments to improving the welfare of soldiers and families. Second, I intend to improve the Army's readiness because preparedness for war contributes to deterrence and survival on the battlefield. This calls for strengthening the equipment base of the total Army and we have a long way to go to fill our equipment needs. Also, we need to continue efforts to improve training of individuals, leaders, and units by increased realism, improved physical fitness, and more extensive

field exercises with joint as well as allied forces. The Reserve components need to be involved as well. Finally, I intend to continue efforts which improve the modernization of our capabilities. During the 1980's some 300 new systems are planned for the total Army. These systems will be important for fielding land force capabilities which are flexible and powerful enough to deal with potential threats, and thereby contribute to deterrence. Do we have any alternative to providing the quality young men and women in our total Army with the bset equipment available?

ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, what do you think is the outlook for the All-Vounteer Army into the 1990s?

General WICKHAM. Looking to the future, the Army should be able to recruit and retain sufficient volunteers to man the force if we continue to receive the support of Congress and the American people. Examples of this support include continued pay comparability, requested recruiting and retention funds, the quality of life improvements needed to allow the Army to remain competitive with the civilian sector, and public recognition particularly among young people that uniformed service is important and honorable.

Environmental factors such as unemployment rates, military/civilian pay ratios, and the size of the youth market are key to manning the force. Current trends indicate that these factors will militate against recruiting in the future. Based on these considerations the Army's strategy for the future is to:

Continue advertising programs to increase the percentage of youth with positive propensity to join the Army, and the military services in general.

Continue enlistment incentive programs to increase the enlistment of high quality youth, and to distribute recruits among the MOS and career fields in accordance with Army requirements.

Continue the efforts to tap the college-bound segment of the youth population by increasing the emphasis on educational assistance programs and 2-year enlistments for the high scoring high school graduate.

The success of this strategy is contingent on maintaining advertising and bonus programs, and development and maintenance of incentive programs such as the Army College Fund. Funding support for this strategy must be based on the fact that the Army requires the largest share of the Department of Defense accessions, and must, to meet its manpower needs, continue to increase the propensity of quality youth to join the Army.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, do you think we need to increase the numbers of our special operations units, such as Rangers and Special Forces?

General WICKHAM. Our current plans provide for a measured expansion of our special operations force structure in the Active component. I support the currently programed expansion.

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle has been a controversial program. Could you share with the committee your views on how the Bradley will change mechanized infantry operations and why it is important?

General WICKHAM. In order to understand the importance of the BFV, it's helpful to explain the interrelationships of the battlefield. Armored and mechanized units depend on mobility, firepower, and armor protection for survival. These units are composed of many elements—artillery, tanks, mecha. 'zed infantry, air defense, engineers, support—all included in a combined arms team. These elements generally need the same mobility and protection, hence the related requirements for the M1, the BFV, the DIVAD, the M109 howitzer, the field artillery ammo support vehicle (FAASV), the fire support team vehicle (FISTV), and the armored combat earthmover vehicle (ACE).

Without the Bradley, mechanized infantry rides in a troop carrier which cannot: (1) keep up with the M1 tank, (2) protect occupants against heavy machinegun and close-in medium artillery airbursts, (3) provide significant anti-tank or suppressive fires, or (4) survive in tactical engagement against modern Soviet weapon systems such as the BMP.

Mechanized infantry with the Bradley can suppress enemy infantry and anti-tank missile systems with coaxial machinegun, 25mm automatic cannon and

firing port weapons, and kill lightly armored vehicles (like BMP) with its 25mm cannon. This can be done while under artillery and heavy machinegun fire, moving or stationary, day or night on an obscured battlefield. Bradleys can kill tanks at long ranges with the TOW subsystem, also while under fire, day or night on an obscured battlefield (with TOW 2 subsystem). Such "standoff" engagements with TOW and cannon enhance the system's survivability. Mechanized infantry battalions with the Bradley have more than three times the number of TOW systems as non-Bradley battalions.

Bradleys permit the mechanized infantry to strike the enemy's rear and flanks as part of a combined arms team. M113s do not.

Whether equipped with M113s or Bradleys, mechanized infantry must dismount to perform tasks such as attacking a dug-in enemy armed with antiarmor systems, providing security in restrictive terrain, fighting in built-up areas and clearing minefields. However, when infantrymen dismount, the Bradley can provide fire support that is far beyond the capabilities of the M113's unprotected, nonstabilized .50 caliber machinegun which has only limited night sighting capability.

The M113 will not survive against close-in dismounted enemy infantry armed with antiarmor systems unless mechanized infantry dismount to fight. This also is true for the Bradley; however, its additional firepower is a far better antiarmor weapon suppressor which provides the option to remain mounted when the enemy cannot use antiarmor weapons effectively.

On a battlefield with numerous enemy tanks and BMPs, Bradley-equipped mechanized infantry can contribute far more than units equipped with M113s through use of speed, agility and significant increase in firepower. This Bradley advantage is true whether the systems fire in overwatch from covered and concealed positions or engage enemy targets in fast-moving engagements.

In short, against forces equipped with modern Soviet equipment Bradleys can win; without Bradleys, mechanized infantry could suffer significant losses.

U.N. FORCES IN KOREA

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, you were formerly the Commander of U.N. Forces in Korea. What is your assessment of the capability of U.S., U.N., and Korean Forces to withstand a North Korean assault

General WICKHAM. The North Korean threat is one of the most dangerous we face in the world. The North Koreans spend about 24 percent of their GNP for the military. They have the fifth largest army in the world and are rapidly modernizing. Their forces are positioned well forward in attack positions. Their leadership is unpredictable and appears committed to reunification of the Peninsula on their terms. All initiatives to reduce tension by the U.N. have been rejected by the North Koreans.

Facing this threat, the Republic of Korea armed forces are allied with U.S. forces in the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command. These in-place forces are outnumbered by the North Korean forces. Given strategic warning of several days, these allied forces would be augmented by mobilization of high quality ROK reserves and powerful U.S. forces from the Western Pacific. In my opinion, these combined forces would be able to defeat North Korean aggression. If a surprise attack occurred with only a few hours warning, the alert forces and extensive defenses in depth of the Combined Forces Command should be able to delay North Korean forces until mobilized reserves and augmentation U.S. forces could be brought into action.

In order to assure deterrence of hostilities, the ROK and the United States must continue efforts to strengthen and modernize forces under the Combined Forces Command.

FORCE REDUCTIONS

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, there has been some discussion in the Congress about force reductions in the Army. Could you explain what the impact of reducing the Army by one active division would be?

General WICKHAM. The size of the Active Army is tied directly to the force required to execute the national military strategy, but is significantly constrained by fiscal realities. Given the current strategy, the JCS have defined the reasonable assurance force to be [deleted] fully structured, fully supported Army divisions, [deleted] of which need to be active in order to provide both a credible deterrent and sufficient combat power for the initial stages of war. Obviously,

with only 16 active divisions, we are [deleted] the number needed to fulfill our national military strategy.

While we are relying on the Reserve components to an increasing extent for round out and support of active units, there is a limit to the ability of the RC to organize, train, support and deploy rapidly additional combat units.

There's a practical problem also. Forty-two percent of the Army is deployed overseas in support of U.S. security interests. This extensive deployment requires a substantial rotation base in the United States if we are to assure high readiness and retention of quality people. Reduction of one active division probably would have to take place in the United States due to the overriding nature of our overseas commitments. Thus the rotation base problem, already serious with certain skills, would be adversely affected. Retention and readiness would suffer.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Senator TOWER. General Wickham, over the last several years, a great deal of combat support has been moved to the Reserves. From your standpoint, has this been a sound policy?

General WICKHAM. A sound policy has been developed which, given the resources that are available, has enabled us to strike a balance in our combat to combat service support forces in the Active and Reserve components. The Army has increasingly transferred Active component unit missions to the Reserve components resulting in either adding or retaining of capability in the Army while providing resources for other high priority force improvements in the Active component. The increase in Reserve component combat service support units has been consistent with the transfer of combat structure to the Reserve components and has continued the trend of 67 percent of the Army's combat service support structure in the Reserve components. Overall, this policy increases Reserve component participation and responsibilities in the Total Army, strengthens Reserve component combat effectiveness and improves the overall capability of the Total Army.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

TRADING OUR ARMY

Senator LEVIN. General Wickham, would you trade our Army—with all its weaknesses and strengths—for the Soviet Army and all its strengths and weaknesses? Why or why not?

General WICKHAM. There are some strengths which would be helpful to us if we had them. For example, the Soviet Army is far larger than our small Active Army, and thus it possesses greater flexibility in meeting threats. The Soviet Army has far more equipment than we do, such as tanks, armored infantry vehicles, artillery, and therefore they are not troubled by any equipment shortages or war reserve problems. Because of their geographic circumstances, the Soviet Army does not have the strategic deployability problems and shortfalls that we do. However, in the final analysis, military strength is measured by the dedication, ingenuity, and ideals of those who serve in a nation's armed forces and by the constancy of a nation's allies. The United States is blessed in that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines—and the officers who train and lead them—are superior in commitment, ingenuity and staying power to their Soviet counterparts.

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Senator LEVIN. What do you consider to be the major strengths and weaknesses of our Army and the Soviet Army, in order of decreasing importance, and including the following areas, at least; (personnel, weapons, tactics, organization, quality, quantity)?

General WICKHAM. Well, sir, as I suggested in the previous answer, a direct comparison would be misleading. The nature of the armed forces developed by each nation differs according to national security interests, geo-strategic factors, historical experience, nature of political system, and economic factors. We have chosen for various reasons to field a small Active Army of volunteers, backed by the two Reserve components. We are endeavoring with congressional support to modernize our forces to keep pace with the threat and to take advantage of technology.

With this background then, let me outline briefly some of our strengths and weaknesses. We are strong because our forces come from free men and women who have a commitment to defend freedom and all it stands for. We have first rate soldiers and leaders. Our equipment is improving and in many areas we possess a technological edge. We have reliable allies. Our fighting organizations and tactical doctrine such as the AirLand Battle are sound. So we don't need to take a back seat to any army.

Of course, we do have some deficiencies which I touched on in earlier answers. We need more equipment. We need more war reserve stocks and sustaining capabilities. We need more strategic deployment capabilities—sea and air. We need to improve the readiness of our Reserves.

The Soviet military establishment has first priority on resources in the Soviet economy. This is reflected in the size, composition, and equipment of the Soviet Army. It has 191 active ground divisions, [deleted] reserve divisions. This large force is generated through conscription, which assures a steady stream of manpower, regardless of economic or social considerations. The conscript's pay is meager, allowing the Soviets to devote a very large portion of military expenditures to research & development and procurement.

The Soviet soldier is a tough "field soldier," accustomed to an austere existence and well-trained in his individual specialty. The individual soldier and small units are trained to react with well-conditioned response in the form of battle drills. The Soviets do not encourage or expect initiative from low-level leaders. While this may be viewed as a weakness, the Soviets probably view it as an asset. In combat, Soviet leaders expect their troops to respond swiftly and reliably, with unquestioning obedience.

Soviet doctrine demands that equipment be designed to satisfy operational requirements in both nuclear and conventional warfare and that it be held on a large scale. In 1982, Soviet equipment holdings included over 50,000 tanks, 70,000 other armed vehicles, and nearly 35,000 artillery systems. New models of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, improved tactical missiles, new air defense and anti-tank systems, and new models of helicopters have been introduced into the forces in the past five years; all evidence an increasingly sophisticated technology that at least partially offsets the clear qualitative advantage enjoyed by United States weapons in the past. While not all units are equipped with materiel of the latest design, older models still in service are types that are effective. New variants of existing items of equipment are continually introduced as modifications are made to take advantage of newer technology or to correct perceived deficiencies.

The Soviet Army does have weaknesses, such as the multinational character of its conscripts, inexperienced junior NCOs and some alcohol abuse. These are largely offset, however, by a severe and overwhelmingly effective disciplinary system enforced by a predominantly Russian officer corps, numerous "warrant officers," who perform duties similar to our NCOs, frequent field duty, and the near-total control of every minute of the soldier's day. Moreover, Soviet tactical leaders are gaining combat experience in Afghanistan.

Senator LEVIN. General Wickham, please provide the same list for the combined armies of non-United States NATO, and those of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact, adding "reliability" to the list.

General WICKHAM. There is little commonality among the various non-United States NATO armies. They vary in size, equipment, structure, and capabilities. Their greatest strengths are industrial might and manpower. The latter will become a problem in the early 1990's, however, as several countries will be facing a shortage of draft-age men. The troops are generally well trained, but many undergo too short a conscript period. The majority of non-United States NATO countries rely heavily on reserve mobilization in order to fill out units in case of war.

Equipment is generally good and improving. Some armies, however, still maintain large quantities of WWII and Korean War vintage equipment. Standardization and interoperability are improving.

Virtually all NATO members consider membership in the Alliance to be the cornerstone of their security policies. The principal focus of the Alliance remains collective defense against the threat from the USSR and Warsaw Pact.

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) military forces are generally organized, equipped, and trained along lines similar to Soviet forces, although there are minor variations in several of the national forces. A key factor, however, is that all NSWP forces use predominantly Soviet equipment, although they trail the Soviet Army in the pace of their modernization efforts.

[Deleted.] Major Soviet forces (30 divisions) are stationed in four key countries (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary). [Deleted.] The period of tension that would likely exist before hostilities would allow the Soviets to manipulate popular attitudes and political leaders.

MODERNIZATION

Senator LEVIN. General Wickham, relative to our other armed services, the Army has been modernized the least in the 1970's, and the disparities between it and Soviet forces is the greatest in terms of overall quality and quantity, is that not so?

General WICKHAM. Yes. During the Vietnam era, war needs had our highest priority and procurement funds for modernization were restricted. Following the war, the Army was faced with meeting equipment needs for pre-positioned equipment stockage requirements, foreign military assistance commitments, and the need to make the necessary investments for improving conventional land warfare capabilities. During that period Army modernization procurement funds were not adequate. Expressed in fiscal year 1984 constant dollars, the Army, from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1982, received $87 billion for procurement. This represents half the amount received by the Air Force and only one third of what the Navy received.

The Army is now beginning to receive its first modernized major weapons systems since the late 1960's. It also faces requirements for large amounts of materiel to fill units to full strength in the Active and Reserve components, as well as fill war reserve stocks of equipment and pre-positioned sets of equipment.

At the same time, the Army is faced with an increasing conventional threat which has fielded significantly improved weapon systems over the past 10 years to place the Army in a position of potential quantitative and qualitative inferiority as it enters the 1980's. The Soviet Union has historically maintained a significant quantitative advantage over US/NATO forces in Central Europe with, even under an optimistic scenario, at least a 2:1 advantage in most weapon categories. The following chart displays the current imbalance.

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT AT M+100 IN EUROPE

	United States/NATO	U.S.S.R./Pact
Tanks Field artillery Armored vehicles (personnel) Air defense SAM Air defense guns Antitank guided missile systems Attack helicopters Surface-to-surface missile Personnel	[Deleted.]	

Note: Includes France, does not include PWRMS, TOE only, includes POMCUS stocks and personnel represents total deployed in timeframe.
The quantitative imbalance will be difficult to reduce. [Deleted.]

Our success in deterrence will depend in large measure on the quality of our equipment coupled with effective, ready, and well trained units. Adequate funding of the Army's modernization program is essential.

ARMY'S SHARE OF THE BUDGET

Senator LEVIN. General Wickham, considering the fact that the Army has the furthest to go to modernize against the Soviet threat and is beginning from a much further behind position—compared to our other services—are you concerned that the Army's share of the overall DOD budget is declining, instead of increasing?

General WICKHAM. Yes, I am concerned. The missions of the Army, its extensive overseas deployments, and potential threats which the Army may be ordered to respond to clearly warrant a larger share of resources. The Army's percent of the budget has decreased in fiscal year 1983 and 1984 to 23.8 percent or 1.4 percent below its peacetime average. This decrease adversely affects the Army's modernization initiatives. Two years ago, the Army made the decision to accept a smaller Army and to initiate essential modernization programs using the resources formerly devoted to personnel costs. This decision provided

additional funds for modernization, within the 25 percent peacetime TOA level, by reducing the percentage of the Army's budget used to support active force personnel from 30 percent in fiscal year 1980 to 23 percent in fiscal year 1984. Because of this decrease in the Army's share of the budget, the Army has been unable to complete its modernization efforts as originally planned.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Senator LEVIN. The Army seems to be "paying the bills" (through reduced resource allocations) for the costs of modernizing the Air Force and Navy, which relatively speaking, need the modernization help much less, would you not agree?

General WICKHAM. All of the services and the forces assigned to our unified and specified commanders need modernization. In allocating resources, the OSD leadership is faced with the same difficult task—but at a higher level—that each of the services faces: resources must be applied in a balanced fashion to a broad range of legitimate, competing requirements in order to provide the Nation with the greatest possible deterrent and warfighting capabilities. Even though there are inadequacies in the Army budget, I believe that each of the services generally has been given an equitable share of the available resources, and that the DOD budget request now before you constitutes a balanced response to the threats posed by all our potential adversaries.

Senator LEVIN. As Chief of Staff, what can you do to reverse this situation?

General WICKHAM. Two things: First, within the Department of Defense, the Army leadership will make the best case possible for additional resources during deliberations on future budgets. Second, I shall provide to the Congress the best military advice I can concerning Army resource requirements.

Senator LEVIN. Everyone knows the fiscal year 1984 and future defense budgets will have to be cut. In which areas, in priority order, should Congress cut the Army budget, if such cuts must be made: readiness and sustainability, including procurement of spare parts, and ammo operations and maintenance and training funds; procurement; personnel pay and benefits; force structure (units in the field)?

General WICKHAM. Our fiscal year 1984 budget request is essential if we are to continue the Administration's efforts to make up for years of inadequate resources. I am concerned about the adverse impact of any budget reductions, whether they be applied to operation and maintenance, force structure or any other component of the budget. The perception that budget cuts will force us to make all our reductions in O&M and force structure is valid only if a potential budget cut is intended to generate immediate outlay reductions, since only our operations and pay accounts have high outlay rates in the first year. If the Congress should determine that budget cuts are necessary, I would ask that, rather than focus on outlays and other similar factors, Congress provide general guidance and suggest which tasks or commitments the military should reduce or abandon. With this guidance, and the acceptance by both Congress and the American people of the resulting increased risks to our national security, we could identify the appropriate reductions.

CINCUSAREUR STATEMENT

Senator LEVIN. General Wickham, would you agree with the following statements by the Army's top commander in Germany?

"It disappoints me," said General Frederick J. Kroesen, "to hear people talk about the overwhelming Soviet conventional military strength. We can defend the borders of Western Europe with what we have. I've never asked for a larger force. I do not think that conventional (non-nuclear) defense is anywhere near hopeless" . . .

"Given good generals, we are not outnumbered too much to win," he says. There are natural advantages that can be exploited in defending Central Europe. He estimates that the Russians and their allies could muster three divisions to his one. He does not see that as an awesome advantage, given the powerful new weapons, trained personnel and fast reaction times of his forces. "At 3-to-1," the general says, "we ought to be able to keep from losing."

General WICKHAM. I agree with General Kroesen, who served with great distinction as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe for the past 4 years. His views assume that we continue our essential force modernization, Division 86 reorganization, and develop the necessary strategic mobility to reinforce rapidly with the forces required to win the battle.

While the Soviet Army presents a formidable foe, properly trained and properly led soldiers in concert with solid allies can successfully defend against a 3-to-1 ratio.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

[The nomination of Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., was reported to the Senate by Senator Tower on April 21, 1983, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 10, 1983.]

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